Download ebook Bloomsbury Studies in Philosophy: The Virtue of Feminist Rationality in FB2, DJV, EPUB
9781472533456 1472533453 Feminist philosophers have been some of the most vocal critics of reason and rationality. While most feminists realize that rationality is a concept that cannot be entirely abandoned, few have considered how to construct a positive account of rationality. This book represents a sustained argument for a feminist theory of rationality. It opens by asking the question: is reason inherently masculine? Deborah K. Heikes goes on to answer this question negatively and to examine what feminists actually want from a theory of rationality, specifying what a virtue theory of rationality is and how it works. She identifies those features that feminists believe are central to reason, identifying four dichotomies that are central to feminist thinking (mind/body, reason/emotion, identity/difference, objectivity/subjectivity), and argues that they can be captured by conceiving of rationality as a virtue concept. She further demonstrates how a specifically feminist theory of rationality can provide objective grounds for feminists' moral, political and epistemic agendas.
9781472533456 1472533453 Feminist philosophers have been some of the most vocal critics of reason and rationality. While most feminists realize that rationality is a concept that cannot be entirely abandoned, few have considered how to construct a positive account of rationality. This book represents a sustained argument for a feminist theory of rationality. It opens by asking the question: is reason inherently masculine? Deborah K. Heikes goes on to answer this question negatively and to examine what feminists actually want from a theory of rationality, specifying what a virtue theory of rationality is and how it works. She identifies those features that feminists believe are central to reason, identifying four dichotomies that are central to feminist thinking (mind/body, reason/emotion, identity/difference, objectivity/subjectivity), and argues that they can be captured by conceiving of rationality as a virtue concept. She further demonstrates how a specifically feminist theory of rationality can provide objective grounds for feminists' moral, political and epistemic agendas.